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A new probabilistic model of data encryption is introduced. For this model, under suitable 
complexity assumptions, it is proved that extracting any information about the cleartext from 
the cyphertext is hard on the average for an adversary with polynomially bounded 
computational resources. The proof holds for any message space with any probability 
distribution. The first implementation of this model is presented. The security of this 
implementation is proved under the intractability assumption of deciding Quadratic 
Residuosity modulo composite numbers whose factorization is unknown. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper proposes an encryption scheme that possesses the following property: 
Whatever is efficiently computable about the cleartext given the 
cyphertext, is also efJiciently computable without the cyphertext. 
The security of our encryption scheme is based on complexity theory. Thus, when 
we say that it is “impossible” for an adversary to compute any information about the 
cleartext from the cyphertext we mean that it is not computationally feasible. 
The relatively young field of complexity theory has not yet been able to prove a 
nonlinear lower bound for even one natural NP-complete problem. At the same time, 
despite the enormous mathematical effort, some problems in number theory have for 
centuries refused any “domestication.” Thus, for concretely implementing our 
scheme, we assume the intractability of some problems in number theory such as 
factoring or deciding quadratic residuosity with respect to composite moduli. In this 
context, proving that a problem is hard means to prove it equivalent to one of the 
above mentioned problems. In other words, any threat to the security of the concrete 
implementation of our encryption scheme will result in an efficient algorithm for 
deciding quadratic residuosity modulo composite integers. 
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1.1. Deterministic Encryption: The Trapdoor Function Model 
Our encryption scheme benefits from the ideas of DifIie and Hellman [9], Rivest, 
Shamir, and Adleman [21], and Rabin [20]. 
Diffie and Hellman [9] introduced the idea of a public key cryptosystem, which is 
based on the intractability of some underlying computational problem. Intuitively, the 
idea is to find an encryption function E which is easy to compute but difficult to 
invert unless some secret information, the trapdoor, is known. Such a function is 
called a trapdoor function. To encrypt a message m, anyone simply evaluates E(m), 
but only those who know the trapdoor information can compute m from E(m). 
The two implementations of a trapdoor function most relevant and inspiring for 
this paper are the RSA function [21], due to Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, and its 
particularization suggested by Rabin [ 201. 
1.2. Basic Objections to the Trapdoor Function Model 
We point out two basic weaknesses of this approach: 
(I) The fact that f is a trapdoor function does not rule out the possibility of 
computing x from f (x) when x is of a special form. Usually messages do not consist 
of numbers chosen at random but possess more structure. Such structural information 
may help in decoding. For example, a function f, which is hard to invert on a generic 
input, could conceivably be easy to invert on the ASCII representations of English 
sentences. 
(2) The fact that f is a trapdoor function does not rule out the possibility of 
easily computing some partial information about x (even every other bit of x) from 
f(x). Encrypting messages in a way that ensures the secrecy of all partial infor- 
mation is an important goal in cryptography. Assume we want to use encryption to 
play card games over the telephone. If the suit or color of a card could be 
compromised the whole game should be invalid. Indeed Lipton [ 171 has pointed out 
that one bit of information about cards to remain hidden can be easily computed in 
the SRA implementation of Mental Poker [22]. 
Though no one knows how to break the RSA or the Rabin scheme, in none of 
these schemes is it proved that decoding is hard without any assumptions made on 
the message space. Rabin shows that, in this scheme, decoding is hard for an 
adversary if the set of possible messages has some density property. We discuss this 
further in Section 2. 
1.3. Probabilistic Encryption: The New Model 
In this paper we switch from a deterministic framework to a probabilistic 
framework. This enables us to deal with the problems that arose with the trapdoor 
function model, without imposing any probability structure on the messages we 
would like to send. 
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We replace the notion of a trapdoor function with the notion of an unapproximable 
trapdoor predicate. Briefly, the predicate B is trapdoor and unapproximable if anyone 
can select an x such that B(x) = 0 or y such that B(y) = 1, but only those who know 
the trapdoor information can, given z, compute the value of B(z). When the trapdoor 
information is unknown, an adversary with polynomially bounded computational 
resources can not decide the value of B(z) better than guessing at random (see 
Section 3 for formal definition). 
We replace deterministic block encryption by probabilistic encryption of single 
bits, where there are many different encodings of a “1” and many different encodings 
of a “0.” To encrypt each message we make use of a fair coin. Thus the encoding of 
each message will depend on the message plus the result of a sequence of coin tosses. 
More specifically, a binary message will be encrypted bit-by-bit as follows: a “0” is 
encoded by randomly selecting an x such that B(x) = 0 and a “1” is encoded by 
randomly selecting an x such that B(x) = 1. Consequently, there are many possible 
encodings for each message. However, messages are always uniquely decodable. 
Two properties of the new model are: 
(1) Decoding is easy for the legal receiver of a message, who knows the 
trapdoor information, but provably hard for an adversary. Therefore the spirit of a 
trapdoor function is maintained. In addition, in our scheme, we do not impose any 
restrictions on the message space. The security of the scheme is proved for messages 
belonging to any message space with any probability distribution. 
(2) No information about an encrypted message can be obtained by an 
adversary. 
Let g: M+ V be a nonconstant function m. Assume that the message space M has 
some probability distribution. Accordingly, let pv = prob(g(m) = v 1 m E M) for each 
v E V, and let fi E V be such that pG = rnaxUEr, pv. Then, without any special ability, 
an adversary given the cyphertext, can always guess the value of g over the cleartext 
and be correct with probability pE. We prove that for a probabilistic encryption 
scheme, an adversary, given the cyphertext, cannot guess the value of g over the 
cleartext with probability better than pa. Note that g needs not be polynomially 
computable, or even recursive. Thus, our encryption model passes a polynomially 
bounded version of Shannon’s perfect secrecy definition; see Subsection 7.3. 
This property enabled Goldwasser and Micali [ 11) to device a scheme for Mental 
Poker for which, under the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, no partial information 
about cards that should remain hidden can be easily computed. 
1.4. Concrete Implementation of the New Model 
We introduce Quadratic Residuosity modulo composite integers whose 
factorization is unknown (see Section 6 for precise definition), as the first example of 
an unapproximable trapdoor predicate. Thus we introduce a new probabilistic public 
key cryptosystem that is secure in a very strong probabilistic sense if and only if 
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deciding quadratic residuosity with composite moduli is hard (see Section 4). The 
security offered by this Public Key Cryptosystems extends to all partial information 
about encrypted messages, to ail possible message spaces and to all possible 
probability distributions for the message space (see Section 5 for formal definition of 
security). 
Another example of such predicates, has appeared in a Goldwasser, Micah, and 
Tong [ 121 and in Goldwasser [ 131. The predicate they propose is unapproximable if 
and only if factoring composite numbers is hard. Using the construction of Section 4, 
we can build a public key cryptosystem based on the predicate they propose. Again, 
any threat to the security of this last cryptosystem, will result in an efficient factoring 
algorithm. 
In [26], Yao shows that unapproximable trapdoor predicates exist if one-to-one 
trapdoor functions exist. 
1.5. Related Work 
Blum and Micali in [5] showed the first example of an unapproximable predicate 
which is not trapdoor. Their predicate is unapproximable if and only if the discrete 
logarithm problem is hard. 
The quadratic residuosity predicate is not only an example of an unapproximable 
trapdoor predicate, but possesses other properties which make it particularly 
attractive for protocol design. It has been widely used since we first proposed it in 
[lo]. The first protocol that uses this predicate was suggested by Goldwasser and 
Micali in [ 111. They design a protocol for two players to play mental poker over the 
telephone, so that no player can obtain any partial information about cards not in his 
hand. Other works in which this predicate has proved useful are: Blum, Blum, and 
Shub’s implementation [4] of a cryptographically strong pseudo random bit generator 
[5], Brassard’s [7] implementation of authentication tags, Luby, Micali, and 
Rackoff s [ 191 method for simultaneously exchanging a secret bit, and Vazirani and 
Vazirani’s [25] implementation of one bit disclosures. 
2. SURVEY OF PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS BASED ON TRAPDOOR FUNCTIONS 
All the number theoretic notation used in this section will be defined in Section 3. 
2.1. What Is a Public Key Cryptosystem? 
The concept of a Public Key Cryptosystem was introduced by Diffie and Hellman 
in their ingenious paper [9]. Let M be a finite message space, let {A, B,...} be users, 
and let m E M denote a message. Let E,: M + M be A’s encryption function, which is 
ideally bijective, and D, be A’s decryption function such that D,(E,(m)) = m for all 
m E M. In a Public Key Cryptosystem E, is placed in a public file, and user A keeps 
D, private. D, should be difficult to compute knowing only E,. To send message m 
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to A, B takes EA from the public file, computes EA(m) and sends this message to A. A 
easily computes DA(EA(m)) to obtain m. 
2.2. The RSA Scheme and the Rabin Scheme 
Two implementations of such encryption functions E, are the RSA function 1211 
of Rivest et al. and the Rabin function [20]. 
The key idea in both the RSA scheme and the Rabin scheme’ consists in the 
selection of an appropriate number theoretic trapdoor function. In the RSA scheme, 
user A selects n, the product of two large distinct primes p, and pz and a number s 
such that s and q(n) are relatively prime, where o is the Euler totient function. A puts 
rr and s in a public file and keeps the factorization of n private. Let Zz = (x E N: 
1 <x < n - 1 and x and n are relatively prime}. For every message m E Zz, 
EA(m) = mS mod n. Clearly, the ability to take sth roots mod n implies the ability to 
decode. A, who knows the factorization of n, can easily take sth roots mod n. No 
efficient way to take sth roots mod n is known when the factorization of n is 
unknown. 
Rabin suggested to modify the RSA scheme by choosing s = 2. Thus, for all users 
A, EA(x) = x2 mod n. Notice that E, is a 4-l function because our n is the product of 
two primes. In fact, every quadratic residue mod n, i.e., every q such that 
q=x’modn for some XE Z,*, has four square roots mod n: ix mod n and 
fy mod n. As A knows the factorization of n, upon receiving the encrypted message 
m* mod n, she could easily compute its four square roots and get the message m. (A 
may compute square roots mod n by first computing square roots modp, and pz and 
then by combining them via the Chinese Remainder Theorem.) The following 
heuristics may be suggested for eliminating ambiguity in decoding: for sending a 
message m, send m* mod n together with the last 20 bits of m. Such extra information 
cannot effectively help in decoding: one could always guess the last 20 digits of m. 
(To avoid publicizing the last 20 digits of m, just select a 20-bit random integer r and 
send (m2*’ + r)’ mod n together with r.) 
The following theorem shows how hard it is to invert Rabin’s function x2 mod n. 
THEOREM (Rabin). If for a l/log n fraction of the quadratic residues q mod n one 
could find one square root of q, then one could factor n in random polynomial time. 
The theorem follows from Lemma 1 which we state without proof. 
LEMMA 1. Given x, y E Z,* such that x2 = y* mod n and x # fy mod It, there is a 
polynomial time algorithm to factor n. (In fact the greatest common divisor of n and 
x f y is a factor of n.) 
Informal Proof of Rabin’s Theorem. Assume that we have a magic box MB such 
1 We will state a simplified version of his method. 
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that given q, a quadratic residue mod n, for a fraction l/log n of the q’s it outputs one 
square root of q mod n. Then we could factor IZ by iterating the following step: 
Pick i at random in Z,* and compute q = i* mod n. Feed the 
magic box MB with q. If M outputs a square root of q different 
from i or -i mod n, then (by Lemma 1) factor n. 
The expected number of iterations is low, as at each step, we have a l/2 log n chance 
of factoring IZ. 
2.3. Objections to Cryptosystems Based on Trapdoor Functions 
The following problems may arise in the RSA and Rabin schemes and, more 
generally, in any other Public Key Cryptosystem based on trapdoor functions: 
(1) The fact that f is a trapdoor function does not rule out the possibility of 
computing x fromf(x) when x is of special form. 
(2) The fact that f is trapdoor function does not rule out the possibility of 
easily computing some partial information about x fromf(x). 
2.3.1. Discussion of Objection 1 
One may argue that Rabin’s Public Key Cryptosystem is as hard to break as 
factoring in the following way: whoever can get messages m from their encryptions 
m* mod n for a fraction I/log n of the time, is actually realizing the magic box of 
Rabin’s theorem and thus could efficiently factor n. 
We would like to point out the following fact. 
Claim. If M, the space of messages, is “sparse” in Zz, the ability to decode for a 
fraction l/log n of all messages does not yield a random polynomial time algorithm 
for factoring. 
By “sparse” we mean that for a randomly chosen x E Z,*, the probability that x is 
a message is virtually 0. 
Let f(x) =x2 mod n. Assume that we are able to invert the function f only on 
f(M). Then, we would have a magic box MB which, on input m* mod n, where 
m E M, outputs m; and on input q 6? {m’ mod n / m E M}, outputs a correct answer, 
for a negligible portion of the q’s. Using such a magic box we could decode, but not 
factor n efficiently. Let us look at the above informal proof of Rabin’s theorem, using 
this MB. If we pick m E M and input m* mod n to MB, then we get m back and 
cannot factor. If we pick i & M and input i* mod n to MB, then the probability that 
any of the square roots of i* mod It, which are different from i, belong to M is prac- 
tically 0 and we get no answer. 
We conclude that for Rabin’s function one can decode if and only if one can 
factor, provided the legal messages are dense in Z,* (e.g., M = Z,* and all messages 
are equally probable). 
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2.3.2. Discussion of Objection 2 
One desirable property for an encryption algorithm is that an adversary should not 
be able to obtain any partial information about the cleartext from the cyphertext. 
For example, let f be a hashing function or a nonconstant predicate defined on the 
message space M. Let m E M. If, given the encryption of m, an adversary can 
efficiently computef(m), then we say that information about m can be obtained from 
the encryption of m. 
Note that if the encryption algorithm, E, is a trapdoor function, then partial infor- 
mation about the cleartext cannot be hidden. In fact, the following predicate B, 
defined on the cleartext, is easy to evaluate from the cyphertext: B(x) = true if and 
only if E(x) is even. We can avoid such problems using probabilistic encryption. 
Let us now discuss a crucial question, raised by Brassard [6], closely related to the 
security of partial information: how to send a single bit securely in a Public Key 
Cryptosystem. 
2.3.3. Attempts to Send a Single Bit Securely in Public Key Cryptosystems Based on 
Trapdoor Functions 
Suppose that user B wants to send a single bit message to user A in great secrecy. 
The bit is equally likely to be a 0 or a 1. B wants no adversary to be able to guess 
correctly his message 5 1% of the time. B knows that users A’s public encryption 
function EA is hard to invert and tries to make use of this fact in the following way. 
IDEA 1. All users in the system agree on an integer i. User B selects r E M at 
random, except for the ith bit of r, which will be his message. B sends EA(r) to A. 
A can decode and thus get the desired bit. But what can an adversary do? 
Danger. Let y = EA (x), where E, is a one way function. Then, given y, it could 
be difficult to compute x but not a specific bit of x. 
EXAMPLE. Let p be a large prime such that p - 1 has at least one large prime 
factor. Let g be a generator for Z, . * Then y E g” modp is considered to be a one-way 
function. But, even though. it is difficult to compute x from gX modp (the index 
finding problem), it is easy to get the last bit of x. In fact, x ends in 0 if and only if y 
is a quadratic residue modp, and there are probabilistic polynomial time algorithms 
for testing whether numbers are quadratic residues modulo primes p (see 
Subsection 3.1). 
The following idea was suggested by Donald Johnson. 
IDEA 2. B constructs a loo-bit integer x as follows: he selects 8 < i Q 100 at 
random, and sets the ith bit of x to the bit he wants to communicate. The remaining 
92 bits of x are chosen at random, except for the first 7 bits of x, which specify 
location i. B sends EA(x) to A. 
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Danger. EA can be a trapdoor function and yet one could, given EA(x), easily 
compute the first 7 bits of x and one of the last 93 bits of x. If this is the case, one 
could correctly compute B’s message x with probability & + f . g. 
Summarizing, there are many ways in which a single bit could be “embedded” in a 
binary number x. Taking the “exclusive or” of all the digits of x is just one more 
example. However, given y = EA(x), being able to discover single bits embedded in x 
does not contradict the fact that it is hard to compute x. Then, what is a secure way 
to send a single bit? Unapproximable trapdoor predicates will provide a solution to 
this problem. 
3. UNAPPROXIMABLE TRAPDOOR PREDICATES 
In Section 4 we introduce the model of a probabilistic public key cryptosystem. We 
show that this model is highly secure. Our model switches from block encryption to 
bit-by-bit encryption. For this purpose we must abandon the notion of trapdoor 
functions for the new notion of unapproximable trapdoor predicates. 
DEFINITION (e-approximates). A circuit C[ .] e-approximates the predicate 
B: R + (0, 1 } if C[x] = B[x] f or at least a fraction f + E of the x E Q. 
We proceed to formally define unapproximable trapdoor predicates. 
Let N denote the set of natural numbers and N’ be an infinite subset of N. For 
every k E N’ let S, denote a subset of the k-bit integers and for every i E S, let fii be 
a subset of the integers with at most k bits. Let 
B,=(Bi:Qi+{O,l}IiES,J 
be a collection of predicates indexed by an integer of size k and 
B= u B,. 
keN’ 
We say that B is an unapproximable trapdoor predicate (UTP) if: 
(1) (B is unapproximable): Fix polynomials P, and P,. Let k E N’. Let ck 
denote the size of the minimum size circuit C[ , ] such that C[ , i](l/P,(k))- 
approximates Bi for at least a fraction l/P,(k) of the i E Sk. We say that B is unap- 
proximable if ck grows faster than any polynomial in k. 
(2) (B is trapdoor): For z, E {0, 1} set Qy = (x E {Qi} 1 Bi(x) = v}. We say 
that B is trapdoor if: 
(a) There exists a probabilistic polynomial in k time Turing machine T, 
that on input (i, v), where i E Sk and u E (0, 1 }, selects x E s2p with 
uniform probability. 
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(b) There exists a function cr: UkcN, S, -+ N such that for some 
polynomial Q, for all X, 1 a(x)] < Q(lxl), and a polynomial time Turing 
machine T2 such that T,[i, o(i), x] = Bi(x) for all i E S,, and for all 
x E 52,. We call a(i) the secret of i. 
(c) (constructibility condition): for all k EN’ it is possible in 
probabilistic polynomial in k time to select any pair (i E S,, u(i)), 
with probability l/i S, I. 
Condition (2c), the constructibility condition, guarantees that if someone picks a 
pair (i, a(i)), where i E S, and publicizes i, it will be hard to compute B,(x). 
Otherwise, suppose the pairs (i, u(i)), i E S,, that could be efficiently selected 
constituted a very small fraction of all possible pairs. Then, an adversary could, from 
the public i, find out u(i) just by repeatedly selecting pairs (j, u(j)) until j = i. 
Remark 3.1. Note that if B is an unapproximable predicate and P,, P, are 
polynomials, then for all sufficiently large k, for a fraction 1 - (l/P,(k)) of the 
iE Sk, lfJ~l/lQil and I~fl/lQil are both greater than i - (l/P,(k)). Otherwise either 
the trivial circuit C, that always outputs 0 or the trivial circuit that always outputs 1 
would (l/P*(k))-approximate Bi for a fraction at least l/P,(k) of the i E S,. 
3.1. Quadratic Residuosity as a UTP 
We demonstrate an example of an unapproximable trapdoor set of predicates, 
under the intractability assumption of the Quadratic Residuosity Problem (QRP). If 
needed the number theoretic definitions can be found in Section 7. 
Let k E N. Let p1 and p2 denote primes. Set, 
H,={~l~=p,p,,~~~~~I~,I=l~,I=~J~ 
z; = {x < n 1 (x, n) = 1). 
And let Zk denote the subset of Z,* containing the elements with Jacobi symbol + 1. 
For all x E ZA, Q, is defined as 
Q,(x) = 1 if x is a quadratic residue mod n, 
=o if x is a quadratic nonresidue mod n. 
Let k E N. Let x and y be binary strings. We denote by x # y the concatenation of 
x and y. Define S,, = {n # y I n E Hk and y E Zi is a quadratic nonresidue mod n). 
Define 52,,, = Zi and set Q,,,(x) = Q,(x) for each x E Zi. Then Q#= { Qn#y / 
rr # y E S,,} is a set of predicates. The presence of the quadratic nonresidue y will be 
needed to show the trapdoorness of Q#. 
(1) Q# is unapproximable: This is shown in Theorem 2 (Section 7), under the 
Quadratic Residuosity Assumption. 
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(2) Q# is trapdoor: Letting u&n # y) be the factorization of IZ, Q# is a 
trapdoor set of predicates. In fact, if the factorization of n is known, Q,(a) can be 
computed in O(k3) time. Moreover, given y, a quadratic nonresidue mod n, we can 
generate quadratic nonresidues mod n with uniform probability in probabilistic 
polynomial in k time by randomly selecting x E Z,* and computing r = yx* mod n. 
(3) Q# is constructible: Consider the following algorithm that selects one 
element n # y E S,, , where nEH, andyEZz’ is a quadratic nonresidue mod n. 
Step 1. Flip 4k fair coins. 
Step 2. Check whether the first k outcomes and the second k outcomes 
constitute, respectively, the binary representation of a prime p, and a prime p2 each 
of size k. If so, let it =p, p2 and check if the last 2k bits constitute a quadratic 
nonresidue y mod n. If so then halt: p, . p2 # y has been selected. Else go to Step 1. 
As each element in Sdk can be generated by exactly one 4k-long sequence of coin 
tosses, the above algorithm selects elements in SOk with uniform probability. Due to 
the Prime Number Theorem and the existence of random polynomial time algorithms 
for primality checking, the above algorithm runs in random poly(k) time. 
We conclude that, under the QRA, Q# is an unapproximable trapdoor predicate. 
4. PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS AND PROBABILISTIC 
PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS 
In the last section we defined UTPs. We are now ready to introduce our 
probabilistic model of encryption. In Subsection 4.2 we formally define the notion of 
a public key cryptosystem (PKC) which is parameterized by a security parameter. In 
Subsection 4.3 we define our model of a probabilistic public key cryptosystem 
(PPKC). In Subsection 4.4 we present a concrete implementations of this model 
based on the QRA, the intractability assumption for the Quadratic Residuosity 
Problem. 
4. I. Preliminary Notation 
The following notation is used throughout the rest of this paper: Let r be a 
probabilistic Turing machine. We write r[/?] to denote the set of possible outputs of r 
on input j3. We give r[p] the following probability distribution: if a E r[j3] then the 
probability of a is the probability that r outputs a on input ,8. 
Let T, and T, be Turing machines. By saying that T, is input to (output by) T, we 
mean that a standard encoding of T, is input to (output by) T,. 
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4.2. Public Key Cryptosystems 
Informally, we think of a PKC as a server. Each user in the system comes to the 
PKC with a description of his message space and a common security parameter k. 
On such inputs, the PKC produces a pair of algorithms: an encryption algorithm 
(which is possibly probabilistic) and a decryption algorithm. The description of both 
the encryption algorithm and the decryption algorithm should be short (polynomial in 
k). Moreover, both algorithms should halt in polynomial time. The user stores the 
(description of the) encryption algorithm in the public file, and keeps secret the 
(description of the) decryption algorithm. 
We proceed to formally define what a PKC is. 
We let k denote a parameter that will be presented in unary to all the algorithms in 
this paper. Let U = {A, B,...} be a finite set of users. 
A message generator is a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine MG that 
on input k outputs a string referred to as a message. 
DEFINITION. A Public Key Cryptosystem is a probabilistic polynomial time 
Turing machine IZ that on inputs k and MG outputs the description of two 
algorithms, E and D such that 
(1) for some constants constants c, on inputs of size n, both E and D halt 
within nc steps, and 
(2) for all m E MG[k], D(E(m)) = m. 
We call E an encryption algorithm generated by I& and D a decryption algprithm 
generated by 27. The encryption algorithms generated by lI may be probabilistic. 
Remark. Let us stress again that l7 is a probabilistic Turing machine, and thus 
on the same input pair (k, MG) it may output many different (encryption algorithm, 
decryption algorithm) pairs. When we are only interested in an encryption algorithm 
E generated by Zi’ on inputs k and MG, we will write E E l7(k, MG). 
4.3. Probabilistic Public Key Cryptosystems 
Let B = UksN, B,, where B, = {B,: Ri -+ {0, 1 } ] i E S,}, be an unapproximable 
trapdoor predicate. A Probabilistic Public Key Cryptosystem (PPKC) with UTP B is 
a PKC n that takes as input the security parameter k and the message generator MG 
and outputs a pair (i, u(i)), where i E S, and u(i) is the secret of i. This can be done 
by the constructibility property of B. 
The output i E S, of Il specifies an encryption algorithm E as follows: E takes as 
input an l-bit binary message m = m, m2 .a- m,. For each mj in the binary represen- 
tation of m, E randomly selects an element xi E a, such that Bi(xj) = mj and outputs 
the I-tuple (xi ,..., xJ. In virtue of the trapdoor property of B this can be done in 
probabilistic time polynomial in k and 1. The output of E is bounded by O(k1). 
In general, consider the binary string b = b, es* b,, where bjE {0, 1). We call any 
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I-tuple (x, ,..., XJ such that xj E 0,. and Bi(xj) = bj for all 1 Qj < 1 a probabilistic 
encryption of b using predicate Bi. Thus, note that in contrast with PKCs based on a 
trapdoor function such as the RSA, in a probabilistic public key cryptosystem every 
message m has many possible probabilistic encryptions. 
The output u(i) of Il specifies a decryption algorithm D as follows: Let T be a 
probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine that on inputs i E S,, x E Qi, and a(i) 
computes Bi(x). Such a T exists by the trapdoor property of B. Then D uses T as a 
subroutine as follows: Let D’s input consist of the I-tuple (x, ,..., x,), where xj E fii for 
every 1 <j < 1. Then for every 1 <j < 1, D calls T with inputs i, a(i), xj to compute 
Bi(xj), and writes every one of Ts 1 answers on its output tape. As T runs in 
polynomial time, so does D. 
4.4. The Quadratic Residuosity Implementation of a PPKCS 
Let us explicitly describe the implementation of a PPKC based on the Quadratic 
Residuosity Problem. 
EXAMPLE 1. Let Q# be the unapproximable trapdoor predicate defined in the 
previous section. Recall, Q# = { Qn++ 1 n # y E S,,}, where n E H, and y E Z,!, is a 
quadratic nonresidue mod n. 
Let ZZ be a probabilistic public key cryptosystem based on the unapproximable 
trapdoor predicate Q#. Let user input the security parameter k to n. On inputs k and 
message generator MG, n works as follows: 
(1) it randomly selects two k-bit primes p, and pz, 
(2) sets n =P,P,, 
(3) picks y E Zi such that y is a quadratic nonresidue modulo n, 
(4) outputs as an encryption algorithm some standard encoding of the pair 
(n, y) and as a decryption algorithm some standard encoding of the pair (pl ,pJ. 
User C publicizes the pair (n, y) keeps secret the pair (p, ,p2). 
How to Encrypt 
Suppose user B want to send a binary string b = b, ... b, to user C. Then, 
for each bi E b, 
B picks x E Z,* at random 
ifbi= 1Bsetsei=yx2modn 
else B sets e, = x2 mod n 
B sends C the 1-tuple (e, ,..., e,) = E,(b). 
Encoding an l-bit message b takes O(lk’) time. In general, one bit of cleartext is 
expanded into k bits of cyphertext. 
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How to Decrypt 
Suppose user C receives (e i ,..., e,), the encryption of a message b. Then, 
for each ei E e, 
C sets bi = Q,(ei). 
(Note: As C knows the factorization of It, he can compute Q,(x)) 
C sets b = b, .a. b,. 
Computing b, 1 b I= I, from its encryption requires O(lk3) time. 
5. THE SECURITY OF A PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM 
We proceed to discuss the notion of security of a public key cryptosystem. Clearly, 
the notion of security in a public key cryptosystem depends on the model of possible 
behavior of an adversary. In this paper the adversary is a passive line-tapper. This 
adversary knows the message space and its probability distribution, knows the 
encryption algorithm, is given the cyphertext, and tries, by computing, to retrieve the 
cleartext. 
5.1. Polynomial Security 
Informal Setting 
Let the message-finder F and the line-tapper T be your favorite computational 
model with polynomially bounded computational resources. Such F and T may be 
polynomial time Turing machines, probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine, 
“small” circuits etc. Intuitively, we say that a public key cryptosystem is 
polynomially secure if for all message spaces M with any probability distribution, the 
encryption algorithms produced by the server will be such that: the polynomially 
bounded message finder F cannot find two messages m, and m2 in M whose 
encryptions are distinguishable by the polynomially bounded line-tapper T. That is, 
given a (an encryption of either m, or m,) T should not have any advantage in 
understanding which of the two messages is being encoded by a. Notice that there 
might very well be a pair of messages whose encryptions are distinguishable by T, 
but it will be impossible for the polynomially bounded F to find such a pair. Note 
that PKCs generating deterministic encryption algorithms (e.g., RSA) cannot be 
polynomially secure. 
In this paper, the message-finder and the line-tapper are chosen to be circuits. 
Formal Setting 
Let IZ be a PKC. Let MG be a message generator. We write Mk for MG[k]. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that all m E Mk have the same length I, = Q(k) 
for some polynomial Q. 
PROBABILISTIC ENCRYPTION 283 
E a c E(m) 
FIGURE 1 
A k-line tapper is a circuit C with one Boolean output and enough Boolean inputs 
to receive (the description of an encryption algorithm) E E l7(k, MG) and a E E(m), 
where m E M, (see Fig. 1). Let m,, m2 E M,. Let pf be the probability with which C 
outputs 1 on inputs E E Z7(k, MG) and Q E E(m,) and pt be the probability with 
which C outputs 1 on inputs E E ZZ(k, MG) and a E E(m,). We say that C 
P-distinguishes m, from m2 with respect to E if Ipy -pf 1 > l/P(k). 
A k-message-finder is a circuit C with 21, Boolean outputs and enough Boolean 
inputs to describe an E E Z’I[k, MG]. On input E, C outputs two messages 
m,, m2 E M, (see Fig. 2). 
Notice that F, may have a built-in description of MG. 
DEFINITION (Polynomially secure public key cryptosystems). Let Q, P,, P, be 
polynomials. Let Z7 be a public key cryptosystem and MG a message generator. Let 
T = ( Tk}, where T, is a k-line-tapper with less than Q(k) gates. Let st be the size of a 
minimum size message-finder F that with probability greater than l/P,(k) on input 
E E Il(k, MG) and MG outputs two messages m, and m2 in M, such that Tk 
P,-distinguishes m, from m2. We say that IZ is a polynomially secure with respect to 
MG if for any sequence of line-tappers T, sr grows faster than any polynomial in k. 
We say that 17 is a polynomially secure if for any message generator MG, I7 is 
polynomially secure with respect to MG. 
Remark. Notice that in the definition of a polynomially secure public key cryp- 
tosystem we are not putting any constraints on the probability of m, and m,. Thus, 
E 
--L 
C 
ml mz 
FIGURE 2 
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not even two messages that are very unlikely to occur and are distinguishable by T, 
can be easily found. 
It is intuitive, and will be formally proved that polynomial security implies more 
traditional notions of security. Informally, if a public key cryptosystem is 
polynomially secure then no polynomially bounded line-tapper T can, given the 
cyphertext, retrieve the cleartext or any partial information about it. 
We first show that the newly introduced probabilistic PKCs are indeed 
polynomially secure. 
Remarks about Theorem 5.1. The underlying idea of the proof of Theorem 5.1 is 
a sampling walk. Assume that every vertex v in a d-dimensional hypercube C is 
labeled with a real number J(v) in between 0 and 1 and that it is easy to find two 
vertices u and v such that In(u) - J(v)1 > E. Then it is easy to find two adjacent 
vertices s and t such that In(s) - n(t)1 > c/d: just find vertices u and v in C such that 
In(u) - n(u)1 > E; then consider (cog,..., ok), a minimum length vertex-walk from u to 
v and look at the pairs (wl, cc,+ i). 
In our case, every vertex v of the hypercube is a d-bit word. The label n(v) is the 
frequency with which the line-tapper outputs 1 on the probabilistic encryptions of u. 
We quickly approximate these frequencies by sampling. Then we find two adjacent 
words s and t with a jump in their associated frequency, and use s and t to approx- 
imate the UTP on which the system is based. 
THEOREM 5.1. Each probabilistic public key cryptosystem is polynomially secure. 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let 
B={Bi:Qi-t{O,l}IiES,andkEN’} 
be an unapproximable trapdoor predicate. Let n be a PPKC that on inputs k and 
MG outputs i E S, and u(i) with probability l/l S,I. This specifies a probabilistic 
encryption algorithm E, as specified in Subsection 4.3. Recall, that Tk, the line- 
tapper, is a poly(k) size circuit which upon receiving as input i and a probabilistic 
encoding of m in Mk encoded using B,, outputs either a 0 or a 1. 
Let f;:,, be the frequency with which Tk outputs a 1 when given as input all the 
probabilistic encodings of m using Bi. 
Let P, and P, be polynomials. For k E N set 
1 1 
Ek=Pl(k) 
and 
G’k = P,(k) 
and let Fk be a message-finder. Let N” be an infinite subset of N’. Assume that for a 
fraction qk of the i E S, Fk outputs two messages mf and mf such that 
If;,,; -.&,;I > &k’ (*I 
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Then we will show that for all k E N”, there is a probabilistic poly(k, 6-i) time 
Turing machine G with oracles Fk and T, that with probability 1 -S, (sJ54)- 
approximates Bi for a fraction r,~,J2 of the i E S,. 
Consequently, as the size of Tk is bounded by a polynomial in k, if also the size of 
F, were bounded by a polynomial in k, G could easily be converted, for each k E N”, 
into a poly(k) size circuit C, that (s,J5l,)-approximates Bi for at least a fraction t7J2 
of the i E S,. This would contradict the unapproximability of B. Thus, the size of F, 
must grow faster than any polynomial in k and II is polynomially secure. 
The Hamming distance between a and b E {0, 1)‘” is the number of bits in which a 
and b differ, and we say that a and b are adjacent if the distance between them is 1. 
We proceed to construct the Turing machine G. Let flfk denote the set of all I,-long 
sequences of elements of Qi. On input i E S, and y E Qi, G guesses B,(y) as follows: 
Part 1. It calls the oracle F, with input i to find mf and rni, in M, such that 
I&d, -fi,rn;l > &k. (*> 
Let A be the distance between mf and ml. Let a,, a,,..., a,, be a sequence of I,-bit 
strings such that a, = m,, ad = m, and aj is adjacent to aj,, for 0 ,< j < A. As 
].&,I -fi,,+] > &k there must exist x, 0 < x f A - 1, such that ]fi,,,-fi,a,+,] > .sk/lk. 
Assign Ri and 0fk the uniform probability distribution. By the trapdoor property of 
B, in probabilistic poly(k, 8-l) time, such a, and a,,, can be correctly found with 
probability greater than 1 - 6 by means of a Monte Carlo experiment. For notational 
convenience, let s = a, and t = a,, 1. Compute fi,, and &. 
As s = (s, ,..., s!,) and t = (tl ,..., tr,) are adjacent, they differ in exactly one location. 
Call this location d. 
Part 2. Assume, without loss of generality, that&,, >J,l. 
Case 1. sd= 1, t,=o. 
Then, 
pick x = (x, , xz ,..., xl,) E Sik at random among all the elements 
e = (e, ,..., e,J in Qfl such that Bi(ej) = sj = tj for j # d and ed = y. 
(Recall that y is the input of G.) 
ifT,(x)=lthenG[y]=l 
else if T,(x) = 0 then G[ y ] = 0. 
Case 2. s,=O and t,= 1. 
Proceed as in Case 1, but set G[y] = 1 - Tk[x]. This completes the description of G. 
Let us prove that, if s and t have been correctly found, for a fraction qk/2 of the i’s 
in Sk, for y E Q,, 
Pr(G[yl =Bi[.Y]) > k + -$. 
k 
571/28/2 1 
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Remark 5.1. As B is unapproximable, by Remark 3.1, for all sufficiently large k, 
for a fraction 1 -(qJ2) of the iES,,, ]@]/]Qi] > $- (eJ41,J and ]fl!]/]Q,] > 
f - (sJ4lJ. Thus, for a fraction greater than ~~(1 - (~$2)) > (vJ2) of the i’s in S,, 
Fk outputs an mf and rni such that I&;--f;,,,;] > ek; AND both ]0:]/]~2~] and 
1~2: ]/] R,] are greater than 4 - (sJ41J. 
The i-signature(x), where x = (xl ,..., xl,) E @, will denote the binary string 
B,(x,) -a - B,(x,,). Then, for such i, in Case 1, 
Pr(Gbl =Bi(Y)> = 2 PWbl = c I B;(Y) = ~1 WBi(Y> EC)) c=O,l 
[Pr(G[y]=lIB,(y)=1]+Pr(G[yl=OI 
B,(Y) = O)l 
= (f-$1 [Pr(T,[x] = 1 ] i-signature(x) = s] 
+ Pr[ T,[x] = 0 ( i-signature(x) = t]] 
In Case 2, following a similar proof, again G will (sk/51k)-approximate Bi. 1 
5.2. Semantic Security 
In this section we define our second criteria of security for a public key cryp- 
tosystem, called Semantic Security. Informally, a system is semantically secure if 
whatever an eavesdropper can compute about the cleartext given the cyphertext, he 
can also compute without the cyphertext. We prove that every polynomially secure 
public key cryptosystem is semantically secure. Thus probabilistic PKCs are seman- 
tically secure. Thus, our encryption scheme passes a polynomially bounded version of 
Shannon’s [23] perfect secrecy definition: Restricting our attention to adversaries 
with polynomially bounded resources available for the analysis of intercepted 
messages, the a posteriori probabilities of an intercepted cryptogram representing 
various messages, are the same as the a priori probabilities of the same messages 
before interception. 
Informal Setting 
Let f be any function defined on a message space M. Thus f need not be fast 
computable or even recursive. We say that f(m) constitutes information about the 
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message m EM. In practice, typical f’s of interest are the identity function, a 
Boolean predicate, a hashing function, etc. 
We want that extracting any information about messages from their encoding 
should be hard even if the probability distribution associated with the message space 
is known. 
Let M be a message space and f be a function defined on M. For all 
m EM, let pm= Prob(x=m]xEM). Consider the image f(M). Define p”= 
max,Ev(CmEf-~cUj PA and vM a value in f(M) that achieves the maximum 
probability. Let E be an encryption algorithm. Consider the following three games. 
Let E be known to an adversary. 
GAME 1. Randomly pick m EM (each x E M has probability px of being 
picked). In this game an adversary is asked to guess the value off(m) without being 
told what m is. 
If the adversary always guesses U” he would be right with probability p”. There is 
no strategy for the adversary that would give him a better winning probability. 
GAME 2. Randomly pick m E M. Compute one encryption a E E(m). Give a to 
the adversary. Now, ask the adversary to guessf(m). 
GAME 3. Let the adversary pick a function fE defined on M. Randomly pick 
m E M. Compute one encryption a E E(m). Give a to the adversary. Now, ask the 
adversary to guess f,(m). 
Informally, we say that ZZ is a semantically secure public key cryptosystem if the 
adversary cannot win Game 3 with higher probability than Game 1. 
Formal Setting 
DEFINITION (Semantically secure public-key cryptosystems). Let 17 be a public 
key cryptosystem. Let MG be a message generator. As before M, = MG[k]. For all 
m E M,, p, will denote the probability that MG will output m on input k. Let fMG = 
{f, : M, + V/E E lI(k, MG), k E N) be a set of functions on MG. For each 
E E @, MG) letp, = max,Ey(C,,,EfF~ P,). 
Let C be a circuit that on input E E Z7(k, MG) and a E E(m), where m E M, 
outputs a string y. Let P, Q be polynomials. We say that C (P, Q, k)-computes fMG 
from 17 if the Prob( y =fE(m) 1 m E Mk, a E E(m)) > pE + (l/Q(k)) for all E 
belonging to a subset S g l7(k, MG) having probability at least l/P(k). 
Let P, Q be polynomials. Let C, QTp denote the size of a smallest size circuit C that 
(P, Q, k)-computes f,, from 17. 
We say that n is semantically secure if for all MG, for allf,, , for all P, Q, CE3” 
grows faster than any polynomial in k. 
THEOREM 5.2. Each polynomially secure public key cryptosystem is semantically 
secure. 
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Proof: Let ZZ be a polynomially secure public key cryptosystem. 
Assume for contradiction that Z7 is not semantically secure. Then there are a 
message generator MG, a set of functions for MG, fhlG = {f,}, polynomials P,, P, 
and Q, an infinite subset N’ E N and a sequence of circuits {C,} such that: 
(1) C, has less than P,(k) gates, 
(2) the subset S, G D(k, MG) has probability greater than l/P(k), and 
(3) for all E E S, on inputs E and a E E(m), where m E MG[k], C will output 
f,(m) with probability (taken over the input a) greater than pE + (l/Q(k)). 
For the remaining part of the proof, k will belong to N’ and i to S,. Let sk = l/Q(k) 
andp, = mwEy Cmsf,-+vj Pm- 
Let c,Y denote the probability that C, outputs y on inputs E and a E E(m). Then, 
rJ m,fE(m) is the probability that C, correctly evaluates fE on inputs E and a E E(m). 
Thus, what we assumed for contradiction can be expressed as 
Pick p from Mk and fix it for the rest of the proof. Define #s Mk to be the set of 
messages m such that 
lr”,,“-e,“I >$ for some 2, E V. 
We observe the following two lemmas. 
LEMMA A. For all constants c > 0, there exists a probabilistic poly(k) time 
algorithm that on input i E Sk and <E aj?nds a v E V such that 
with probability 1 - (I/kc). 
Proof: Construct a random sample of encodings of message r using encryption 
algorithm E. Let {x I ,..., xs} denote this sample. Compute C,[E, xi] for 1 <j < s. Let 
Z”(X) = 1 if C,[E, X] = V, 
=o if C,[E, X] # V, 
and set au= 2 r< j<s Z,(xj)/s for all the v E V such that C[E, xj] = v for some j 
between 1 and s. There are at most s values in V for which this frequency is nonzero. 
Similarly, construct a random sample of encodings of message p using encryption 
algorithm Ei. Let { yr,..., y, } denote this sample. Set /.?, = C14i<s Z,(Yj)/S for all the 
u E V such that C,[E, yj] = v for some j between 1 and s. Examine the two lists (each 
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of size less than s) of a,‘~ and &‘s. If there exists a B in at least one of the two lists 
such that Ias-&] > 3&i/40, output V: 
We claim that for an appropriate choice of sample size 8 this output is correct with 
probability 1 - l/k’. The reasoning is as follows. Set s = 1/(4[ 1/2kC][e:/8012). Then, 
for the v’s such that ] rf,, - r;,” ( > &i/10. (Remember that such a u exists as < E li;i>, 
the weak law of large numbers guarantees that the, 
and 
Prob 
i 
6 (a,---,,I <x 
1 
> 1-h 
And finally, 
Prob : (a,-&] > $1 
>Prob 
And inversely, for a u such that I a, - /I,1 > 3&i/40, the 
LEMMA B. Cm& Pm > %JlO* 
ProoJ Let V, = {U E VI rp,v > E J6}, V4 = {V E V ] rflAU < E J6}, and, respectively, 
M, = {m E Mk - ~7 I rr,fE(m) > E J6} and M., = M, - M- M,. M, includes all 
messages m & li? such that&(m) E V, and M, includes all messages m G? E such that 
f,(m) is not in V3. Clearly, I= I V,] < 6/ek. Denote the values in I’, as {u, ,..., u!}. 
Then, 
PE +‘k< c Pd&~, 
mEMk 
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which (since Vm & li?, I$,,+, - r$fECmt( < &i/10) is less than or equal to 
t . . . + C Pm (C,u,tf) +($t$-) 
rnGf,-'(u,) 
13&, 
<C Pm+PE+T* 
meti 
After rearranging both sides of the equation we get, CmEBpm > edlO. 1 
Lemmas A and B imply that for all k E N’ there exists a poly(k) circuit Fk such 
that on input E E S, Fk produces two messages m, and m, in Mk and a value v in 
fel(Mk) such that (r$,,” - rEz,vl > &i/20. 
Fk works as follows. On inputs E it randomly picks a ,U in Mk. Then, it randomly 
generates an element { in Mk. (With probability at least ~/lo, Lemma B tells us that 
<E &?; if it is not, do not worry.) A v E V is then sought using Lemma A such 
that I Q,~ - L, ] > $20 with high probability. If such a v is not found, it is probably 
because c was not in li? after all, and we pick another c until success comes after an 
expected polynomial number of trials. If v is found, set m, = < and m2 = ,u. 
Now, define T,Ji, X] = 1 if Ck[i, x] = v and 0 otherwise. Then Tk is a poly(k) line- 
tapper that (&220)-distinguishes the two messages m, and m2 found by Fk. This 
contradicts the hypothesis that IZ was a polynomially secure public key 
cryptosystem. I 
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6. THE QUADRATIC RESIDUOSITY PROBLEM (QRP) 
We introduce a new trapdoor number theoretic predicate based on the quadratic 
residuosity assumption. 
Let x and y be integers. The symbol (x, y) will denote the greatest common divisor 
of x and n. The symbol Prob(X) will denote the probability of the event X. Let N 
denote the set of positive integers and n E N. Let Z,* = {x ] 1 < x < n - 1 and 
(x, n) = 1). 
6.1. Background and Notation 
Given q E Z$, is q =x2 mod n solvable? If. n is prime, then the answer to this 
question is easily computed [ 161: yes if qCn-“‘* mod n = 1 and no if q@-‘)‘* mod n = 
-1. If a solution exists, q is said to be a quadratic residue mod n. Otherwise q is said 
to be a quadratic nonresidue mod n. In this section, p1 and p2 will be odd, distinct 
primes and n=p,p,. Then, q = x2 mod n is solvable if and only if both 
q = x2 modp, and q = x2 modp, are solvable. Thus, if the factorization of n is 
known, the solvability of q = x2 mod n is easily decidable. 
LEMMA 1. Given the prime factorization of a composite integer n, deciding 
whether q E Z,*, is a quadratic residue mod n can be done in O(l n I”) time. 
Some information about deciding whether a number is a quadratic residue mod n, 
when the factorization of n is unknown, can be obtained from the Jacobi symbol. Let 
p be an odd prime and q E Z:, then the Jacobi symbol (q/p) equals 1 if q is a 
quadratic residue modp and -1 otherwise. The Jacobi symbol (q/n), is defined as 
(q/n) = (q/p,)(q/pJ. Despite the fact that the Jacobi symbol (q/n) is defined through 
the factorization of n, (q/n) is computable in polynomial time even when the 
factorization of n is not known! 
It is easy to see, from the above definitions that if (q/n) = -1 then q must be a 
quadratic nonresidue mod n. In fact, q must be a quadratic nonresidue either modp, 
or mod p2. However, if (q/n) = + 1, then either q is a quadratic residue mod n or q is 
a quadratic nonresidue modulo both the prime factors of n. 
In this paper we are interested in those elements of Zz whose Jacobi symbol is $1. 
Thus we introduce the set. 
ZA = {x ] x E Z,* and (x/n) = 1 }. 
Let us count the number of elements of Zi ‘. See [ 161 for proofs. 
FACT 1. Let p be an odd prime. Then Zp* is a cyclic group. 
FACT 2. Let g be a generator for Z f, then gs mod p is a quadratic residue if and 
only ifs is even. 
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COROLLARY 3. Half of the numbers in Zf are quadratic residues and harf are 
quadratic nonresidues. 
FACT 4. Let n =pI pz (pl and pz are distinct odd primes). Then hav of the 
numbers in Z,* have Jacobi symbol equal to -1 and thus are quadratic nonresidues. 
The Jacobi symbol of the rest of the numbers is 1. Exactly half of these latter ones are 
quadratic residues mod n. 
6.2. The Quadratic Residuosity Assumption 
Let n be a composite integer, and q an element of Zi ‘. The Quadratic Residuosity 
Problem with parameters q and n is to decide whether q is a quadratic residue mod n. 
If the factorization of n is not known, then there is no known efficient procedure for 
solving the quadratic residuosity problem with parameters n and q in Zi ‘. This 
decision problem is a well-known hard problem in Number Theory. It is one of the 
main four algorithmic problems discussed by Gauss [8] in his “Disquisitiones 
Arithmeticae” (1801). A polynomial solution for it would imply a polynomial 
solution to other open problems in Number Theory. One example is deciding whether 
a composite integer n, is the product of 2 or 3 primes (see open problems 9 and 15 in 
Adleman [2]). 
In order to formally state the intractability assumption of the Quadratic 
Residuosity Problem, let us introduce the predicate Q, and the set of hard composite 
numbers Hk. For all x E Zf,, the predicate Q, is defined as: 
Q,(x) = 1 if x is a quadratic residue mod n, 
=o if x is a quadratic nonresidue mod n. 
Hk will denote the set of hard composite integers: Let p, and pz denote primes. 
The elements of Hk constitute the hardest inputs for any known factoring algorithm. 
Quadratic Residuosity Assumption (QRA) 
Let P, be a fixed polynomials. For each integer k, let C be a circuit with two 2k-bit 
inputs and one Boolean output. Let C, be the minimum size of circuits C such that 
for a fraction l/P,(k) of the n E Hk, C[n, x] = Q,(x) for all x E Zi’. Then, for all 
polynomials Q, for all sufficiently large k: C, > Q(k). 
Next, we show that under the QRA, computing Q,(X) is hard not only for some 
special x E Zi, but is hard on the average. 
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6.3. A Number Theoretic Result 
We recall that a circuit C[.] e-approximates the predicate B: 0 + (0, I} if C[x] = 
B[x] for at least a fraction j t E of the x E Q. 
Let us recall the weak law of large numbers: 
Weak Law of Large Numbers 
Let Y, , Y, ,..., y, be r independent O-l variables such that yi = 1 with probability p, 
and S, = CL= r yi, then for real numbers w, 6 > 0, r > 1/46w2 implies that 
Prob(](S,/r) -p 1 > w) < 6. Notice that r is bounded by a polynomial in w- ’ and 6- ‘. 
Remarks About Theorem 1. Theorem 1 shows that deciding Quadratic 
Residuosity mod n is either “everywhere hard” or “everywhere easy.” The main idea 
of this theorem is “how to collect a stochastic advantage,” namely, how to turn an 
oracle that answers most questions correctly, but you do not know which ones, into 
an oracle that answer every question correctly with arbitrarily high probability. 
THEOREM 1. Fix polynomial P, and P,, and let O[., -1: N x N-+ {0, 1) be an 
oracle. Let S be the set of hard integers n such that 0 [e, n] (l/P,(I n I))-approximates 
Q, . Then there is a probabilistic poly(] n 1) algorithm with oracle 0 that, for any n E S 
and any x E Zf,, with probability greater than 1 - (l/P,(lnl)) correctly decides 
whether x is a quadratic residue mod n. 
Proof: Let n E S. Take Zj with the uniform probability distribution. For 
notational simplicity let E = l/P,(I n 1) and 6 = l/P,(I n I). Then, Prob(O[q, n] = Q,(q) ] 
q E Z:) > f + E. Let, a = Prob(O[q, n] = 1 ] Q,(q) = l), and /I = Prob(O[q, n] = 1 I 
Q,(q) = 0). 
The Prob(O[q, n] = Q,(q) I q E ZA) = ia t f(1 - /I) > 5 t E. Therefore, 
a -P > 2~ but a can be much less than f t E. We first need to get a good estimate 
for a. 
Construct a sample of r quadratic residues chosen at random in Zz (the value of r 
will be defined later on). This can be easily done by picking s, ,,,., s, at random in Z,* 
and squaring them modulo n. Initialize a counter C to 0. 
For i = 1 to r, ask the oracle for the value O[sf mod n, n]. Increment C each time 
that the oracle answers 1 (i.e., “quadratic residue”). 
Let I,V = s/2. If r is chosen to be suitably large, r = 1/6y/‘, the weak law of large 
numbers assures that C/r is a good (e/2)-estimate for a: 
i.e., C/r is a good approximation to how well the oracle “guesses” Q, if the inputs are 
only quadratic residues. 
We are now ready to describe a procedure for determining the quadratic 
residuosity of any element in ZA. Let q be an element of Zi that we want to test for 
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quadratic residuosity. Randomly generate r quadratic residues, x1,..., x,, in 2: and 
compute yi = qxi mod n for i = l,..., r. Notice that 
(1) if q is a quadratic residue, then the yi)s are random quadratic residues, 
(2) if q is a quadratic nonresidue in Zi, then the yi)s are random quadratic 
nonresidues. 
Let us postpone the proof of (1) and (2) and assume, for the time being, that they are 
true. Initialize a counter (? to 0. For i= 1 to k call the oracle to get the value 
0[ yi, n]. Increment c every time that the oracle answers 1. Output “q is a quadratic 
residue mod n” if [(C/r) - (E/r)1 < E and “q is a quadratic nonresidue mod n” 
otherwise. 
Since the 
Prob (If- / ’ 1 a ( z q is a quadratic residue 
and 
Prob (I$- 1 s 1 /? < -2- q is a quadratic nonresidue 
then 
Prob(answering q is a quadratic nonresidue 1 q is a quadratic nonresidue) 
=Prob (I:--:1 <E / qisaquadraticnonresidue) 
>Prob(iG-a/<+)XProb(if-/II <+),(l-+]*>(l-6). 
Thus the quadratic residuosity of any q E Zi is decided correctly with probability 
greater than 1 - 6. 
We still need to prove (1) and (2). To prove (1) it will suffice to prove that, given 
any quadratic residue q, any other quadratic residue y in Z,* can be uniquely written 
as y = qx mod it, where x is also a quadratic residue mod n. Let g, and g, be 
generators for, respectively, Zz, and Z,,,. * Let a and b be such that a -g, modp,, 
a = 1 modp,, and b z 1 modp, and b E g, modp,. By the Chinese Remainder 
Theorem such a and b exist. Then, any element of Z,* can be written uniquely as 
a’d mod n, where 1 < i <p, - 1 and 1 <j <pZ - 1. Moreover, q is a quadratic 
residue mod IZ if and only if it can be written as q = a*‘b*j mod n, where 1 < 2i < 
p,-1 and 1<2j,<p,- 1. Thus if y = azsbzt mod n is any quadratic residue there 
exists a unique x quadratic residue mod n, x = a2(s-i)b2(1-i), such that y = qx mod n. 
This proves (1); (2) is proved in a similar way. 1 
COROLLARY 1. Fix polynomials P, and P,. Let k E N. Let C, be the size of the 
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minimum size circuit C that (l/P,(k))-approximates Q, for a fraction l/P,(k) of the 
n’s in H,. Under the QRA, for all polynomials Q, for all suflciently large k: C, > 
Q(k). 
Proof: Assume, for contradiction, that there exist polynomials P, , P,, and Q and 
an infinite 15 G N such that for all k E fl: C, < Q(k). Then, for each k E N, let S, 
contain an l/P,(k) fraction of the elements of Hk and c, be a circuit of size C, such 
that for all n E S,, ck[x, n] = QR,(x) f or at least f + (l/P,(k)) of the elements of 
Z+’ n * 
For every k E fl, choose the oracle 0 of Theorem 1 to be ck. That is, set O[x, n] = 
c,Jx, n] for all n E S, and all x E Zk. Then, by Theorem 1, for all k E #, for all 
n E S,, for all x E Zi, and for all polynomials P, , there is a probabilistic polynomial 
in k time algorithm with oracle (?k that correctly decides quadratic residuosity of 
x mod n with probability greater than 1 - (l/P,(k)). As the size of C, is less than 
Q(k), for all k E # such an algorithm can be transformed into a polynomial in k size 
circuit that correctly decides quadratic residuosity mod n for all n E S,. As 1 S, 1 > 
(l/P,(k)) ]Hk], this contradicts the QRA. 1 
Let n be a composite integer whose factorization is unknown. We want to 
investigate what happens to the difficulty of deciding Quadratic Residuosity modulo 
n when we are given the extra knowledge that a particular y E Zi is a quadratic non- 
residue mod n. 
Remarks about Theorem 2. When the factorization of n is secret, no effcient 
algorithm for selecting a quadratic nonresidue mod n is known. Thus it may be that 
revealing, say, the smallest quadratic nonresidue in ZA may endanger the secrecy of 
the factorization of n or make deciding quadratic residuosity modulo y1 easy. 
Theorem 2 shows that the complexity of the quadratic residuosity problem remains 
unchanged if a randomly selected quadratic nonresidue modulo n is revealed. In other 
words: Assume that for a polynomial fraction of the quadratic nonresidues x E Zi, 
knowing that x is indeed a quadratic nonresidue mod n would lead to an efficient 
decision procedure for quadratic residuosity mod n. Then, quadratic residuosity 
mod n could have been efftciently decided without such extra help. 
THEOREM 2. Let P, and P, be Jxed polynomials. For each k E N let E, G H, 
contain a fraction l/P,(k) of the integers in H,. For each n E E,, let S, contain a 
l/P,(k) fraction of the quadratic nonresidues in Zi . Let C, be the size of the smallest 
circuit C[., ., .] such that for all n E E,, for all s E S,, and for all x E Zi 
C[n, s, x] = Q,(x). Then, for all polynomials Q, for all suficiently large k: C, > Q(k). 
Proof: Let k E N. Fix polynomials P, and P, . Let C[ +, ., . ] be a circuit of size C, 
such that C[n, y, q] = Q,(q) for all n E E,, y E S,, q E ZA. The proof is divided into 
3 parts: 
(1) There exists a probabilistic algorithm A,, with oracle C[., ., .I, that on 
input n E E,, outputs x E ZA such that, with probability greater than 1 - (l/P,(k)), 
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C[n, x, .] (l/P,(k))-approximates Q,(.). Algorithm A 1 terminates in expected time 
which is polynomial in k. 
(2) Algorithm A 1 can be converted into a circuit C, [ ., .] of size polynomial in 
k and C,, such that for all n E E,, q E 2:) C, [n, q] = Q,(q). 
(3) By the QRA, for all sufficiently large k, the size of C, exceeds any given 
polynomial in k. Therefore, again for sufficiently large k, for any given polynomial Q, 
C, > Q(k)- 
We proceed to prove part (1). On input n E E,, define algorithm A, as follows: 
repeat 
(1) select x at random from 2:. 
(2) select k elements e, ,..., ek at random from ZA. (comment: This can be 
accomplished in probabilistic poly(k) time by selecting elements r E [ 1, n] with 
uniform probability and checking whether r E Z,* and (r/n) = 1). 
(Comment: with probability greater than 1 - (1/2k), one of the ets is a quadratic 
nonresidue mod n.) 
(3) Set e, = 1. 
(4) For i = 0 ,..., n, j = l,..., k 
(5) select a sample of random quadratic residues mod n, x, ,..., xk, and 
compute JJ,,~ = e,xj mod n. 
(Comment: as e, = 1, { yO,I ,..., YO,k} is a sample of random quadratic residues mod n. 
With probability greater than 1 - (1/2k), for some i > 0, { ~~,~,...,yi,~} is a sample of 
quadratic nonresidues in ZA). 
(6) For i = O,..., k, 
(7) set f; = CC,“=, C[n, x, Yi,jl/k)* 
(Comment: f f estimates the probability that C[n, x, .] outputs 1 on elements of Zi 
whose quadratic character is the same as that of e, .) 
untilft= 1 andf;=O for some i> 1. 
output x. 
We now prove that, with probability greater than 1 - (l/P,(k)), algorithm A, 
computes x such that C[n,x, .] (l/P,(k))-approximates Q,(e). Let a, = 
Prob(C[n, x, q] = 0 ] Q,(q) = 0) and /?, = Prob(C[n, x, q] = 0 1 Q,(q) = 1). Then, as 
f: = 1 and f f = 0 for some i > 1, then for all sufftciently large k, the weak law of 
large numbers assures us that 1 a, - p,] > (1/2P,(k)). By Theorem 1, this implies that 
C[n, x, +] P,(k)-approximates Q,(.). 
Finally, about AI’s running time. Note that, if in a given iteration of the algorithm 
we draw an x from S, and one of the e,‘s is a quadratic nonresidue, thenf; = 1 and 
f; = 0 and the algorithm terminates. Thus, the expected number of iterations 
performed by algorithm A, is 
Cl- W’Y P,(k) * 
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As each iteration, can be performed in probabilistic poly(k) time, A i runs in expected 
polynomial in k time. This proves part (1). 
Part (2) follows from Corollary 1, and standard transformations of probabilistic 
algorithms into circuits. Part (3) follows easily from part (2). I 
COROLLARY 2. Let P,, P,, and P, be fixed polynomials. For each k E N let 
E, G H, contdin a fraction l/P,(k) of the integers in H,. For each n E E,, let S, be a 
l/P,(k) fraction of the quadratic nonresidues in ZL. Let C, be the size of the smallest 
circuit C[., a, a] that on inputs n E E, and s E S,, (l/P,(k))-approximates Q,. Then, 
for all polynomials Q, for all sunciently large k: C, > Q(k). 
What this corollary says is that, assuming the QRA, when user B is presented with 
(n, y) where n E H, and y a quadratic nonresidue in ZL and x E Z’i, he cannot guess 
Q,(x) with probability greater than 4. 
6.4. A Special Property of Quadratic Residuosity 
Let n E H, and a = (x1,..., x,J be a probabilistic encryption of a k-bit message m 
using the predicate Q,. Given a, anyone, without knowing the factorization of n, can 
reencrypt m. In fact he could choose, with uniform probability, another probabilistic 
encryption of m by simply multiplying each xi by a different, randomly selected, 
quadratic residue mod n. 
This property has been used by Luby, Micali, and Rackoff in [ 191 for fairly 
exchanging a secret bit. 
7. FINAL REMARKS 
7.1. Circuits versus Turing Machines 
Let A be a user in a public key cryptosystem and k the number of bits in the 
description of the encryption algorithm E, put by A in the Public File. Assume one 
(finally) proves that, for all polynomial time Turing machines M, there exists a 
constant k,, such that for all k > k,, inverting EA on some message space requires 
n(2fi) steps. As a passive eavesdropper is entitled to choose M after E, has been 
put in the public file, what k should A choose? 
It is to remove this difficulty that we have chosen circuit complexity as a 
complexity measure. It should be noticed that such choice is not needed for proving 
our theorems. Intractability with respect to probabilistic polynomial time Turing 
machines could have been assumed and all the theorems would have been proved in 
essentially the same way. 
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1.2. Other Types of Adversaries 
In a public key cryptosystem, getting hold of the cyphertext by eavesdropping and 
trying, by computing, to decrypt it, is the most obvious attack. However it is not the 
only one! Goldwasser, Micali, and Tong [9], show how in the Diffie and Hellman 
model of a public key cryptosystem, an adversary can, being a user, break the 
security of the scheme by communicating. They proposed a modification of the Diffie 
and Hellman model and show that the new model is secure against line tappers and 
even against chosen cyphertext attack. 
1.3. The Relationship between Shannon’s Perfect Secrecy Definition and Semantic 
Security 
Let us describe Shannon’s definition of “perfect secrecy” in [23]. Consider an 
adversary with unlimited time and manpower available for analysis of intercepted 
cryptograms. Let the set of all possible messages be finite. These messages have a 
priori probabilities and are encoded and sent across the wire. When an adversary 
intercepts an encoded message, he can calculate the a posteriori probabilities for the 
various messages. Perfect secrecy is achieved if for all encoded messages the a 
posteriori probabilities are equal to the a priori probabilities. Thus intercepting the 
message gives the adversary no information. In this paper, we defined a polynomially 
bounded version of Shannon’s perfect secrecy, called semantic security. Semantic 
security means that when the adversary has only polynomially bounded resources 
available, intercepting the encoded message gives him no new information. Moreover, 
there exists no function defined on the message set that the adversary can compute 
after intercepting the encoded message which he could not compute without inter- 
cepting the message. For further discussion see [26]. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Our most sincere thanks go to Manuel Blum and Richard Karp, who supervised this research, for 
their encouragement and wonderful ideas which they so readily shared with us. We are particularly 
grateful to Zvi Galil, Mike Luby, Charles Rackoff, and Ron Rivest for their generous help in clarifying 
the ideas and presentation in this paper. Many thanks are also due to Steve Cook, Faith Fich, Jeff 
Shallit, Mike Sipser, and the referee for many ideas, comments, and criticism on both form and content. 
Vijai Vazirani helped in the claim of Subsection 2.3.1. 
REFERENCES 
1. L. ADLEMAN, K. MANDERS, AND G. MILLER, On taking roots in finite fields, in “Proceedings of the 
18th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science,” pp. 175-177, 1977. 
2. L. ADLEMAN, On distinguishing prime numbers from composite numbers, in “Proceedings of the 
2lst IEEE Symposium on the Foundations of Computer Science,” pp. 387408, Syracuse, N.Y., 
1980. 
PROBABILISTIC ENCRYPTION 299 
3. M. BLUM, Coin flipping by telephone, in “Proceedings of the IEEE, Spring Comp-Con, pp. 133-137, 
1982. 
4. L. BLUM, M. BLUM, AND M. SHUB, “A Simple Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generator,” 
CRYPTO, 1982. 
5. M. BLUM AND S. MICALI, How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo random 
bits, in “Proceedings of the 23rd IEEE on the Foundations of Computer Science,” Chicago, Ill., 
1982. 
6. G. BRASSARD, Relativized cryptography, in “Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Symposium on the 
Foundations of Computer Science,” pp. 383-391, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1979. 
7. G. BRASSARD, On computationally secure authentication tags requiring short secret shared keys, 
CRYPTO, 1982. 
8. C. F. GAUSS, “Disquisitiones Arithmeticae,” 1801, translated by A. Arthur and S. J. Clark, Yale 
Univ. Press, New Haven, 1966. 
9. W. DIFFIE AND M. E. HELLMAN, New direction in cryptography, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory IT- 
22 (6) (1976), 644-654. 
10. S. GOLDWASSER AND S. MICALI, “A Bit by Bit Secure Public Key Cryptosystem,” Memorandum 
No. UCB/ERL M81/88, University of California, Berkeley, December 1981. 
11. S. GOLDWASSER AND S. MICALI, Probabilistic encryption & how to play mental poker, keeping 
secret all partial information, in “Proceeding of 14th STOC Conference,” San Francisco, 1982. 
12. S. GOLDWASSER, S. MICALI, AND P. TONG, Why and how to establish a private code in a public 
network, in “Proceedings of the 23rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science,” Chicago, 
Ill., 1982. 
13. S. GOLDWASSER, “Probabilistic Encryption: Theory and Applications,” Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of 
California at Berkeley, 1983. 
14. S. GOLDWASSER, S. MICALI, AND A. YAO, Strong signature schemes and authentication, in 
“Proceedings, 15th STOC,” Boston, Mass., 1983. 
15. K. R. GUY, How to factor a number, in “Proceedings of Fifth Manitoba Conference on Numerical 
Math.,” pp. 49-89, 1975. 
16. D. KNUTH, “The Art of Computer Programming,” Vol. 2, 2nd ed., Addison-Wellesley, Reading, 
Mass., 1981. 
17. R. LIPTON, How to cheat at mental poker, in “Proceeding of the AMS Short Course on Cryp- 
tology,” January 1981. 
18. G. MILLER, Riemann’s hypothesis and tests for primality, Ph.D. thesis, U.C. Berkeley, 1975. 
19. M. LUBY, S. MICALI, AND C. RACKOFF, How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a 
symmetrically-biased coin, FOCS 1983. 
20. M. RABIN, Digitalized signatures and public-key functions as intractable as factorization, MIT/ 
LCS/TR-212, Technical Memo MIT, 1979. 
21. R. RIVEST, A. SHAMIR, AND L. ADLEMAN, A method for obtaining digital signatures and public key 
cryptosystems, Communications of the ACM, February 1978. 
22. A. SHAMIR, R. RIVEST, AND L. ADLEMAN, “Mental Poker,” MIT Technical Report, 1978. 
23. C. E. SHANNON, Communication theory of secrecy systems, Bell System Tech. J. 28 (1949), 
656-715. 
24. D. SHANKS, “Solved and Unsolved Problems in Number Theory,” Chelsea, New York, 1978. 
25. V. VAZIRANI AND U. VAZIRANI, Secure one-bit disclosures using a pseudo random number 
generator, in “Proceedings, FOCS,” 1983. 
26. A. YAO, On the theory and application of trapdoor functions, in “Proceedings of the 23rd 
Symposium on the Foundations of Computer Science,” Chicago, III., November 1982. 
